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Income inequality has grown in English-speaking economies in
recent decades, largely due to growing wage inequality (see
Atkinson et al., 2011, for international evidence; and Brewer and
Wren-Lewis, 2016, who show that over 1978–2008 in the UK, rising
earnings inequality counteracted falls in inequality due to other in-
come components). A variety of explanations for rising wage in-
equality have been proffered, including increasing returns to skill
induced by skills-biased technological change (SBTC) (Autor et al.,
2008), changes in labor market institutions, most notably de-
unionisation (Dustmann et al., 2009; Card et al., 2004) and increased
trade (Autor et al., 2013). In their seminal paper for the United States
Lemieux et al. (2009) (henceforth LMP) show that performance pay
(PP) accounted for one-ﬁfth of the growth in wage inequality among
men between the late 1970s and early 1990s, andmost of the growth. This is an open access article underin wage inequality among high earners in the top quintile. They show
that PP became more widespread between the 1970s and early
1990s, was closely tied to individuals' productive characteristics,
and that the returns to these characteristics were rising faster in PP
jobs than in ﬁxed wage jobs. Their ﬁndings are consistent with a
world in which SBTC increases the rewards for more productive
workers and induces ﬁrms to resort to PP to both attract and
incentivise those workers.
LMPs (2009) model, which draws on the work of Lazear (1986,
2000) and Prendergast (1999), indicates PP generates higher
wage dispersion than ﬁxed rate pay (FP) due to the sorting of
high ability workers into PP jobs – a labor market segmentation
type argument – and because PP reﬂects individuals' marginal
product more accurately than ﬁxed wage schedules. Growth in PP
jobs allows high ability workers to recoup returns to their ability
in a way that is not possible with ﬁxed wages, while the higher in-
cidence of PP at the top end of the earnings distribution will also
generate higher wage dispersion.
LMP attribute the increased use of PP to SBTC and the declining costs
of worker monitoring due to advances in technology. These trends arethe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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were studying, both in the United States and in other industrialised
countries. For instance, Sommerfeld (2013) documents an almost con-
tinuous rise in the share of PP jobs between 1984 and 2009.
And yet LMP'sﬁndings have recently been challenged in a series of pa-
pers using data for the United States. Using establishment data from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employer Costs for Employee Compensation
(ECEC) series (which derives from the National Compensation Survey)
Gittleman and Pierce (2013) show the proportion of jobs with PP rose
in the 1990s, only to fall in the 2000s such that, by 2013, it had declined
by about one-ﬁfth since LMP's study period, irrespective of howonemea-
sures PP. This decline is apparent throughout thewage distribution but is
concentrated among low earners. Furthermore, in a second paper,
Gittleman and Pierce (2015) show that the contribution of PP to growth
in the earnings distribution in the ﬁrst decade of the 21st Century has
been small — in the order of 9% of the growth in variance. Sommerfeld's
analysis for Germany also showed that despite the expansion of PP, it
did not lead to increased wage inequality because it was associated
with higher wages across the board and not just for high earners.
Twomore papers ﬁnd LMP's basic results do not hold for some parts
of the working population. Like LMP, Heywood and Parent (2012) ana-
lyze the Panel Survey of IncomeDynamics (PSID). They ﬁnd that, during
the period 1976–1998, the tendency for PP to be associatedwith greater
wage inequality at the top of the male earnings distribution applies to
white workers but not to blackworkers. In a second paper using theNa-
tional Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Heywood and Parent
(2013) ﬁnd skilled fathers select into PP jobs, whereas skilled mothers
select out of PP jobs, a ﬁndingwhich is not consistent with standard as-
sumptions regarding workers sorting into PP jobs on ability. This, in
turn, raises questions about the effects of PP on wage inequality.
In Britain wage inequality among full-time workers has been rising
since the late 1970s, although the rate of change slowed dramatically
in the 2000s, with all the growth being conﬁned to the top part of the
wage distribution (Machin, 2011; Lindley and Machin, 2013). Over the
whole period the graduate wage premium rose, despite growth in the
graduate share in employment andhours, suggestingdemand for highly
skilled labor was exceeding its supply (Lindley and Machin, 2013). This
is consistent with SBTC, and the authors ﬁnd direct evidence of greater
demand for more educated workers in more technologically advanced
industries (Lindley and Machin, 2013: 175–176). They also point to
the introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999 and its subse-
quent up-rating as a reason for the stability in the 50–10wage differen-
tial in the 2000s.
Although they point to the potential importance of SBTC in the Brit-
ish context, Lindley and Machin do not consider the potential role
played by PP in growing wage inequality. There is some evidence that
annual bonuses have contributed to an increase in wage inequality at
the top of the earnings distribution in the last decade or so, primarily
as a result of a large bonus receipt by bankers, traders and other well-
paid professionals in the Finance sector (Bell and Van Reenen, 2010,
2011, 2013).1 These employees may be sharing in the substantial rents
generated by a lack of competition in the sector. Alternatively, they
may be beneﬁting from productivity “scaling” effects that accrue to
highly productive employees when changes such as increased ﬁrm
size and capital intensiﬁcation “scale up” worker productivity, increas-
ing returns to their employer. This is the type of effect identiﬁed by
Gabaix and Landier (2008) andKaplan (2012) in relation to “superstars”
such as CEOs.
But, aside from the effects of bonus payments at the very top, what
effects has PP had on the overall wage distribution in Britain? Two1 However, bonuses account for only a small proportion of total earnings for those out-
side the top decile of earners (Bell and Van Reenen, 2013, 10–11).studies using cross-sectional linked employer–employee data come to
different conclusions. Manning and Saidi (2010) show that, although
there is awage premium attached to the receipt of PP, it had a negligible
effect on wage dispersion in 2004. However, using data from the 2011
Workplace Employment Relations Survey Bryson et al. (2014) ﬁnd PP
results in a sizeable widening inwage differentials relative to a counter-
factual wage distribution, and that this effect is larger higher up the
earnings distribution. The premium rises markedly as one moves up
the hourly wage distribution: it is seven times higher at the 90th per-
centile than it is at the 10th percentile in the wage distribution (.42
log points compared to .06 log points). This, coupledwith the higher in-
cidence of PP among those with wage-enhancing attributes, means PP
contributes substantially to higher wage dispersion in Britain. However
its overall effect on the wage distribution is less marked than it might
have been due to the relatively low proportion of employees on PP con-
tracts in Britain.
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, in
light of the debate in the US about the changing role of PP, we track the
incidence of PP using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) for the
period 1998–2008 that immediately preceded the recession. We con-
sider alternative broad and narrow deﬁnitions of PP and estimate their
individual, job and workplace correlates. Next we estimate the premi-
um associated with PP jobs and look at how it changed over the decade.
Finally we estimate the effects of PP on wage dispersion and changes in
the wage distribution over the period, accounting for the changing PP
premium as well as changes in the prevalence of PP at different parts
of the distribution.
We ﬁnd no indication that PP jobs (broadly or narrowly deﬁned) are
becoming increasingly prevalent. Depending on the measure used and
splitting by gender, we ﬁnd either gradual declines or broad stability, al-
though PP jobs may have picked up slightly among full-time women in
the two years before the recession. Nonetheless the returns to PP re-
main positive, even when controlling for unobserved personal charac-
teristics, and in fact seem to have increased over the period.
Conﬁrming other recent studies, we show that wage inequality grew
somewhat during the decade of economic growth that ended abruptly
with the recession, largely due to growing earnings dispersion in the
top half of the wage distribution (with some reduction in inequality at
the bottom for women). Estimates of PP effects on the counterfactual
wage distribution conﬁrm PP increased earnings dispersion among
men and women, including the sub-group of full-time working
women. PP also appears to have contributed to reduced wage disper-
sion at the bottom amongwomen. In both cases, the changes are largest
for the broad measure of PP, which includes bonuses. Nevertheless the
effects overall are reasonably modest — while overall PP remains a
disequalising force on the wage distribution in Britain, the fact that it
has not become more widespread has limited its impact on wage
inequality.
In the next section we outline the theoretical links between wage
dispersion and PP. 3 Three then introduces the data while Section 4
which presents results relating to the incidence and correlates of PP
followed by its links to wages and wage dispersion in Britain. Finally
Section 5 discusses the implications of the ﬁndings and draws some
conclusions.
2. Wage dispersion and performance pay
In perfectly competitive labor markets in which ﬁrms and workers
have perfect information employees would be paid their marginal prod-
uct, that is, theywouldbepaid for their performance.However, employers
and employees often prefer ﬁxed wage contracts based on time rather
than effort or output. Employers may ﬁnd ﬁxed wages less costly to ad-
minister, especially if labor inputs or outputs are costly to monitor: it
can be costly forﬁrms to identify the contribution of individual employees
to output, while factors beyond the control of the employee, and even the
ﬁrm, mean output is affected by factors other than employees' talent and
3 We investigated whether attrition between the start and end periods was related to
PP by estimating a probit equation for whether individuals present in 1998–2000 were
still present in 2006–2008, as a function of observable characteristics (those included in
the main analysis) and dummy variables for broad and narrow PP receipt (see below for
deﬁnitions). The PP coefﬁcients were individually and jointly insigniﬁcant (joint p-
value = 0.64), suggesting that there is no differential attrition based on PP status.
4 We essentially follow the approach in the inequality literature which uses repeated
cross-sections to document trends over time (over long periods the individuals at the
end are necessarily different to those at the beginning). As discussed below, the additional
advantage of panel data is that we can include ﬁxed effects when estimating the PP premi-
Table 1
Bonus and PRP receipt, 1998–2008 (row and column percentages).
PRP
No Yes Total
Bonus
No
90.8 9.2 100.0
73.2 41.2 68.3
Yes
71.7 28.3 100.0
26.8 58.8 31.7
Total
84.8 15.3 100.0
100.0 100.0 100.0
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ployees are paid for their performance, compared to a counterfactual sce-
nario in which they are paid a ﬁxed wage. Under ﬁxed wage schedules
employees are paid for time worked, whereas under PP they are paid for
output. Heterogeneity in individuals' ability to increase output, either by
virtue of talent or effort, is ignored in ﬁxed wage schedules, but it does
have a bearing on earnings when pay is linked to performance.
There are three channels thatmay lead to higher earnings dispersion
in the presence of PP. The ﬁrst is a mechanical effect: PP reveals under-
lying differences in individuals' productivity that were previously ig-
nored. Second, PP may have the effect of incentivising effort:
employees can raise (lower) their earnings through higher (lower) ef-
fort such that variance in effort induces variance in earnings, whereas
employees' earnings are not a function of effort in ﬁxed wage jobs.
Third, employees will sort into (out of) PP jobs according to talent and
other traits (such as their tastes for effort and risk) that may affect
their earnings. If more able workers sort into PP jobs where they can
command higher earnings, while less able workers prefer the guarantee
of a ﬁxed wage, the market will segment into high and low earners
along PP lines. Thus via all three of these channels, the introduction of
PP should lead to greater wage dispersion than might obtain if all
workers were paid a ﬁxed wage.
Of course this is an over-simplistic picture because job retention and
job progression are often performance-related, even when workers are
paid a ﬁxed wage, because wage levels and earnings progression reﬂect
workers' efforts and talent, while career concerns can incentivise effort
(Prendergast, 1999; Papps et al., 2011). But the link between perfor-
mance and pay is usually more explicit and more direct in the presence
of PP schemes.
While all these considerations suggest that PP will be associated
with greater wage dispersion in cross section, the impact of PP on
changes in wage dispersion are less clear. LMP (2009): 3–4) discuss
some reasons why PP may induce growth in earnings dispersion. If de-
mands for more skilled andmore able workers are rising due to SBTC or
globalisation, this will raise the market value of more talented workers
such that ﬁrms may bid up their price relative to less talented workers
as they try to inﬂuence the job matching process. This, in turn, may in-
duce greater worker sorting between PP and FP jobs, contributing to
growth in the dispersion of earnings between PP and ﬁxed pay jobs. If
there is an increase in the prevalence of PP, particularly at the top end
of the earnings distribution, thiswill also contribute to a growth in earn-
ings dispersion.
3. Data
We analyze data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS),
which began in 1991 with a sample of some 5000 households from En-
gland, Scotland and Wales. Household members aged 16 or over were
interviewed annually (usually in September or October) through to
the ﬁnal year 2008. In addition there are new entrants to the survey
(e.g. children reaching age 16 and new partners of original sample
members) in accordance with the BHPS ‘following rules’; together
with the survey weights, these are designed to ensure that the sample
stays broadly representative of the British population structure.2
The analyses focus on employees aged 18–64 years who provide
valid observations for all included variables, and in addition we exclude
those reporting total weekly hours of 100 or more or 5 or less. This re-
striction, which affects fewer than 2% of observations, reduces possible
measurement error in hourly wages arising from extreme reports of
hours worked. It also eliminates very small jobs. To account for the2 Given the rules for new entrants to the survey, it will not reﬂect the impact of immi-
gration in themid-2000s. In addition,we do not include the Scotland,Wales and Northern
Ireland extension samples added in 1999 and 2001, as this would introduce a discontinu-
ity in the data.possibility of different wage determination processes across gender,
we perform separate analyses for men and women. We also analyze a
sample of women in full-time jobs only to make sure that any gender
differences do not reﬂect the much larger proportion of women (than
men) in part-time jobs (where PP is less common).
Because of the new entrants, some attrition out of the survey, and
the many labor market transitions that take place over the lifecycle
(due to childcare, unemployment, sickness and retirement), the
panel of employees that we analyze is not balanced. Indeed we
would not wish to restrict the analysis in this way, because the sam-
ple would constitute a highly selected group of people with a dispro-
portionately strong attachment to the labor market.3 Instead, we use
all available observations to get as close as possible to a representa-
tive sample of employees in each wave (and we apply the survey
weights to correct for non-response).4 The sample composition
does change over time, but this is broadly consistent with known
trends in the UK economy.5 Our decomposition analysis allows for
this by using period-speciﬁc coefﬁcients to correct for observable
differences between PP and FP workers.
The analysis covers 1998 (wave 8) to 2008 (wave 18) and the full
sample over this time window comprises 3918 men and 4221
women, both observed on average for 5.6 waves. In our analysis
comparing sub-periods at the start (1998–2000) and end (2006–
2008) of the time window, we work with smaller samples (2791
men and 1965 women in 1998–2000; 2235 men and 2476 women
in 2006–2008).
All our descriptive estimates of PP prevalence and trends are
weighted using the cross-sectional weights provided with the sur-
vey, which account for survey design and the likelihood that a re-
spondent appears in a particular wave. In our main counterfactual
analysis, these weights are also incorporated into the weights that
we derive to simulate what the wage distribution would look like
without PP jobs (the ﬁnal weight is the product of the survey weight
and counterfactual weight).6
As is standard in the literature7 our wages measure is hourly
wages, which we compute as (usual gross pay / (usual basic
hours + 1.5 × usual paid overtime hours). The usual gross payumand, importantly, we canmeasure PP jobs rather than just PP receipt at a point in time.
5 There is a trend towards higher qualiﬁcations, some occupational upgrading, and a
substantial fall inmanufacturing. The sample also ages by about one year over 1998-2008.
6 In addition, as discussed below, the survey weights are multiplied by an “endpoint”
adjustment weight that accounts for the lower number of within-job observations near
the ends of the panel.
7 See, for example, Stewart and Swafﬁeld (1997).
Table 2
Overlap of bonus and PRP receipt, 1998–2008 (cell percentages).
PRP
No Yes Total
Bonus
No 62.0 6.3 68.3
Yes 22.7 9.0 31.7
Total 84.8 15.3 100.0
Fig. 1. a — Incidence of PP jobs, broad measure b:
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ly wage measure will take account of these components of PP. We
can also construct a second hourly pay measure including more ir-
regular bonuses (such as seasonal bonuses), derived from a separate
question in the survey.While in principle this secondmeasure better
reﬂects total bonus payments received, it carries a risk of double
counting if respondents report some bonus payments in answer to
both questions (the second question does not explicitly exclude all
regular bonuses). As a result we use the ﬁrst wage measure as our
baseline dependent variable, but as a robustness check we also run
all analyses with the wage measure including irregular bonuses
(the results are almost identical).
BHPS contains two measures of PP. The ﬁrst, relating to bonuses, is
derived from the question: “In the last 12 months have you received
any bonuses such as a Christmas or quarterly bonus, proﬁt-related pay
or proﬁt-sharing bonus, or an occasional commission?”. The second
measure relates speciﬁcally to performance-related pay (PRP). Respon-
dents are asked: “Does your pay include performance related pay?” The
bonus question was asked in Waves 6–18 and the PRP question in
Waves 8–18. As we wish to combine information from the two mea-
sures we focus on Waves 8–18 covering the period 1998–2008.8
Gittleman and Pierce (2013) emphasise the importance of
recognising that PP measures often capture different types of PP, some
more closely related to individual productivity than others. In our
data, the PRP question arguably captures pay linked to individual per-
formance, while the bonus question captures payments like Christmas
bonuses and rewards, such as proﬁt related pay, that are probably
linked to team or ﬁrm performance. Across the pooled sample PRP is
roughly half as prevalent as bonus receipt (15% compared to 32%, see
Table 1).
While the two measures are positively correlated, over 70% of those
receiving bonuses do not get PRP and 41% of those receiving PRP do not
get bonuses (Table 1). So to some extent PRP and bonus receipt are dis-
tinct types of compensation. Aswe show later it is also the case that em-
ployees in PRP and bonus jobs differ somewhat in their characteristics.
Gittleman and Pierce (2013) present two PPmeasures: a broadmea-
sure including incentive pay and all bonuses; and a narrow PP measure
restricted to incentive pay and performance-based bonuses only.We fol-
low their approach. Our broad measure of PP combines the PRP and
bonus questions (receipt of PRP, bonus, or both),while our narrowmea-
sure is conﬁned to the PRP measure (receipt of PRP, with or without
bonus). Table 2 shows that 62% of employees did not get either PRP or
bonus, thus the prevalence of PP broadly measured is 38%, whereas
15% receive PP narrowly deﬁned.
Tables 1 and 2 above relate to the receipt of PP. However, throughout
the analysis presented in Section 4 we follow other papers in the litera-
ture by focusing on PP jobs, not receipt. A job is a period of employment
with the same employer in the same “grade”, i.e. if a worker gets promot-
ed it is a new job. A job is classiﬁed as a PP job where the respondent has
been in receipt of PP on at least one occasion. This adjustment is made in8 A different question about bonuses was asked inWaves 1–5: “Does your pay ever in-
clude incentive bonuses or proﬁt related pay?” It includes fewer bonus components than
the later question and about 10% fewer people reported bonuses each year by this mea-
sure. As we wish to use consistent measures for each year, and also combine the bonus
and PRP measures for some of the analysis, we do not use the earlier bonus question.recognition of that fact that some jobs are PP jobs but that, for whatever
reason (poor performance on the part of the ﬁrm or individual, for in-
stance) there has been no receipt of PP in a particular year - that is to
say, the respondent may be in a job that pays for performance but, in a
given year, the PP due is £0, thus making it hard to distinguish from a
ﬁxed pay job.9
Since the probability of a PP job paying out for performance is partly
a function of the number of times that job is observed in the data (which
is lower for jobs near the ends of the data window) it is necessary to
make an “endpoint adjustment” which accounts for the presence of
jobs of different durations. Following LMP's approach we construct an
adjusted measure of the prevalence of PP jobs by estimating probit
models for the probability of appearing in each wave of the data based
on the number of times a job is observed. The resulting predicted prob-
abilities are used to construct a weight which then effectively holds the
distribution of the number of times a job is observed to that observed in
the middle of our sample.4. Results
4.1. The prevalence of PP and its correlates
Fig. 1a shows the incidence of PP jobs using the broadmeasure (PRP
plus bonuses). It is apparent that men are more likely to be in PP jobs
than women and that, among women, PP jobs are more common in9 All results presented later are robust to classifying a “job” as the total spell with a par-
ticular employer. These results are available from the authors on request.
Table 4
The PP Wage Premium, 1998–2000 and 2006–08 compared.
1998–2000 2006–2008
OLS FE OLS FE
Broad PP
Men
0.077** 0.049** 0.129** 0.060**
(0.010) (0.014) (0.012) (0.021)
Women
0.077** 0.050** 0.090** 0.055**
(0.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.022)
Women (FT)
0.070** 0.042** 0.101** 0.022
(0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.024)
Narrow PP
Men
0.071** 0.039** 0.098** 0.056**
(0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.024)
Women
0.070** 0.065** 0.098** 0.070**
(0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.027)
Women (FT)
0.067** 0.040** 0.104** 0.029
(0.012) (0.018) (0.014) (0.027)
Number of persons (person-observations) in 1998–2000 is 2791 (6598) [men]; 2920
(6867) [women]; 1965 (4323) [FT women]. Number of observations in 2006–08 is 2235
(5416) [men]; 2476 (5972) [women]; 1624 (3611) [FT women]. Dependent variable is
the log hourly wage. Regression-adjusted estimates also control for quadratics in age
and job tenure, and dummies for marital status, part-time work, temporary and ﬁxed
terms jobs, trade union coverage, public sector status, occupation (9 categories), industry
(11 categories), establishment size (3 categories), region (13 categories), and wave. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. *signiﬁcant at 10%; **signiﬁcant at 5%.
Table 3
Correlates of bonus and PRP jobs, 1998–2008 (bivariate probit).
Bonus
job
PRP job
Wald test of equal
effects
Female −0.032 0.023
Age/10 0.225** 0.118
(Age/10)2 −0.031** −0.025*
Married −0.021 0.010
Log (gross hourly wage) 0.313** 0.357**
Part-time (≤30 h total) −0.147** −0.268** **
Seasonal or temporary job −0.776** −0.529** **
Fixed term job −0.622** −0.596**
Job tenure 0.110** 0.062** **
Job tenure squared −0.003** −0.002** **
TU or staff assoc. at workplace 0.021 0.241** **
Public sector −0.498** −0.049 **
Manager 0.146** 0.156**
Professional −0.064 0.149* **
Technician −0.031 0.026
Clerical 0.109 0.074
Craft −0.052 0.047
Personal −0.199** −0.141
Sales 0.281** 0.431**
Operative −0.102 −0.056
Routine
Agriculture −0.399** −0.321*
Mining & utilities −0.028 0.344** *
Construction −0.217** −0.199**
Retail and hotels −0.032 −0.065
Communications 0.158** 0.038
Finance and property −0.012 0.158** **
Other industries −0.277** −0.088 **
Social work & health −0.857** −0.751**
Education −0.908** −0.261** **
Public administration −0.700** −0.126 **
Manufacturing
Establishment 500+ employees 0.151** 0.195**
Establishment 50–499 employees 0.073** 0.100**
Establishment 1–49 employees
1999 −0.072** 0.019 **
2000 −0.155** −0.068** **
2001 −0.149** −0.074** **
2002 −0.164** −0.091** **
2003 −0.176** −0.089** **
2004 −0.222** −0.110** **
2005 −0.261** −0.100** **
2006 −0.305** −0.135** **
2007 −0.341** −0.175** **
2008 −0.364** −0.195** **
Constant −0.782** −1.568** **
Correlation of equation errors 0.484**
Log pseudolikelihood −45,733.0
Persons (person-observations) 8139 (45,658)
Reported estimates are the coefﬁcients from a bivariate probit model. Additional controls
included for region (12 categories). Observations are pooled over waves 8–18, with stan-
dard errors adjusted for clustering within individuals. Estimates are weighted to account
for survey design and non-response and for the endpoint adjustment. *signiﬁcant at
10%; **signiﬁcant at 5%.
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undertaken by men were PP jobs. Among women, the ﬁgure is closer
to one-half. The incidence of PP jobs declines a little over the decade be-
fore the recession began, the drop beingparticularly notable among full-
timewomen. There is no evidence at all that PP jobs becamemore com-
mon except perhaps a small rebound amongwomen towards the end of
the period.
Fig. 1b presents the same information but this time for the narrow
measure of PP which is based solely on the performance-related pay
question referred to in Section Three. The male–female gap is smaller
on this narrow measure, and it narrows over the period since 1998 be-
cause the percentage of jobs undertaken by men that are PP jobs has
been falling. The percentage of PP jobs among women was broadly sta-
ble, though as for the broad measure, there is some indication that itmay have increased slightly after 2006. Overall, though, we see no
clear evidence that PP jobs expanded over this period.
Table 3 shows a bivariate probit estimated for the pooled sample
which establishes the correlates of bonus-paying jobs and PRP jobs, hav-
ing accounted for the positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation in
unobservables between the two. There are a number of points worth
noting. First, consistent with the graphical evidence, the incidence of
both bonus jobs and PRP jobs has declined signiﬁcantly since the turn
of the century having conditioned on employees' demographic, job
and workplace characteristics. For PRP jobs there was an abrupt decline
in 2000 followed by further decline after 2006. Bonus jobs also fell
sharply in 2000 but then declined more steadily. Second, those in re-
ceipt of both types of PP have higher gross hourly earnings than those
in ﬁxed pay jobs: even after accounting for occupation, tenure, and
other characteristics that inﬂuence wages (such as ﬁrm size) those in
PP jobs have gross hourly wages that are around one-third higher
than those among observationally equivalent ﬁxed pay employees.
Third, the male–female differential in PP jobs, apparent in the ﬁgures
above, is not signiﬁcant having accounted for other factors. PP jobs are
more likely to be full-time, permanent, and in managerial, clerical and
sales occupations. PRP jobs are more likely to be unionised than ﬁxed
wage jobs, but this is not the case for bonus jobs. The quadratic in years
of job tenure turns at about 36 years for bonus jobs and 24 years for
PRP jobs, both of which are above the 90th percentile of the job tenure
distribution, so the probability of bonuses increases in tenure for most
employees. Unsurprisingly both types of PP job are more likely in larger
organisations and the industry patterns are as found in the literature.4.2. Is there a performance pay premium?
Before looking at the growth in wage dispersion in Britain and the
role PPmayhave playedwe run log hourlywage regressions to establish
whether there is a PP premium at the mean and, if so, how much of it
can be explained by the selection of workers into jobs. Appendix
Table A.1 reports rawwage gaps as well as regression-adjusted gaps es-
timated by OLS and ﬁxed-effects respectively for the full period 1998–
2008. For both men and women, and whether looking at broad or nar-
row PP, there is a sizeable raw wage differential (up to around 20%)
which falls when regression adjusted by OLS (typically by about half)
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fact that the premium fallsmarkedlywhen adjusting for person ﬁxed ef-
fects is a clear indication that there is positive selection into PP jobs.
To see in more detail how the PP premium changed over time,
Table 4 reports estimates of the adjusted premia from the start and
end of the time period, pooling observations from 1998 to 2000 and
from 2006 to 08 respectively. The OLS estimates increased for all three
subgroups on both PP measures, from around 7–8% to about 10%.10
The FE estimates also increased, albeit by smaller amounts and not for
womenworking full time (for them the PP premium, on bothmeasures,
fell from 4% in 1998–2000 to an insigniﬁcant 2–3% in 2006–08). But
overall there appears to be evidence of an increase in the returns to PP
over the period.Whether this increase also leads to risingwage inequal-
ity will depend on where PP workers are in the wage distribution and
also on how thedecline in theprevalence of PP played out across thedis-
tribution. In the next sectionwe turn to the net effect of all these factors.
4.3. Does performance pay affect wage dispersion?
In this section we look at changes in log hourly wage dispersion be-
tween 1998 and 2008 in BHPS for men, women, and full-time women.
First we graph dispersion in both tails of the wage distribution relative
to the median. To check whether the BHPS results are consistent with
other sources, we compare them to those elsewhere in the literature
which tend to rely on the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings
(ASHE) and its predecessor the New Earnings Survey (NES), in particu-
lar Lindley and Machin (2013). To ensure we have sufﬁcient sample
sizes we use two-year moving averages.11 Then we present descriptive
information on the mean and standard deviation in log hourly earnings
for PP jobs and those in FP jobs. Finally, we compare the actualwage dis-
tributionwith a counterfactual wage distribution to recover the effect of
PP on wages in different parts of the wage distribution. We will explain
the methodology behind this below.
Fig. 2a–c show the log hourly wage distributions for men, women
and full-time women respectively over the period 1998–2008. For
men we ﬁnd increasing dispersion at the very top of the distribution
(the 99–50 differential), but little change further down (the 95–50 and
90–50 differentials).12 At the bottom we see no real change except in
the 50–1 differential which fell until 2001–2 then increased sharply. In
their analysis Lindley andMachin (2013)ﬁnd that the 90–50 differential
increased over the period while the 50–10 differential reduced slightly
(they do not consider the extreme tails). For women, we ﬁnd increasing
dispersion at the top and reducing dispersion at the bottom over 1998–
2008, which is similar to the trends reported by Lindley and Machin in
the 90–50 and 50–10 differentials.
We therefore see some evidence of a growth inwage dispersion over
the period, as do ^ L$_amp_$amp;MLindley and Machin (2013) though
formen there are somedifferences as towhere precisely in the distribu-
tion this widening occurred. These differences could relate to sample
differences, such as the incomplete ASHE coverage of low paid workers
or the lack of coverage of new immigrants in BHPS, or the fact that very
high and very low earners are more difﬁcult to reach with household
surveys (Bollinger et al., 2014).13
How is PP related towage dispersion over the period? Table 5 shows
the mean and variance of log hourly wages in the PP and FP sectors for
the pooled years. It is apparent that mean wages are higher in the PP10 It is notable that the regression-adjusted premium of around 10% is similar to the es-
timate Bryson et al. (2014) obtain having accounted for workplace ﬁxed effects using the
2011 Workplace Employment Relations Survey.
11 This means that, on average, we have around 35–40 unweighted observations in the
1% tails (25 observations for full-time women).
12 Similarly there is no evidence of increasing dispersion towards the middle of the dis-
tribution (not reported).
13 A comparison with published ASHE earnings ﬁgures for 2008 indicates that the 90th
percentile of weekly gross earnings is about 10% lower in BHPS than in ASHE.sector, in keepingwith thewage premium analysis above. The evidence
on variance is mixed: it is very slightly higher for men in PP jobs than in
FP jobs, but the variance for women is slightly lower in PP than FP jobs
(especially by the narrow measure). In spite of this ﬁnding, PP has the
potential to affect the earnings distribution owing to the fact that em-
ployees receive a PP wage premium and, as also seen in Table 3, tend
to lie higher in the earnings distribution even conditioning on other
job characteristics. This conjecture is given further credence by looking
at changes in mean log hourly wages and the variance in log hourly
wages for FP and PP employees between 1998–2000 and 2006–2008.
It is apparent that mean log hourly wages grewmore quickly for PP em-
ployees than for FP employees for men, women and full-time women,
and whether one uses the narrow or broad measure of PP (Appendix
Table A.2). However, the percentage change in the variance in log hour-
lywageswas no greater in PP jobs than it was in FP jobs. The implication
is that any growth in wage dispersion that is attributable to PP is due to
a growing gap in mean wages between the two sectors, as opposed to
greater growth in within-sector wage variance.
Our estimates of the relationship between PP and thewage distribu-
tion are based on a reweighting estimator originally deployed by
DiNardo et al. (1996) and then applied in a modiﬁed form by LMP
(2009). The method constructs a counterfactual wage distribution
which proxies the wage distribution that would obtain in the absence
of PP in the economy. This is achieved by reweighting those sample
memberswho are not in receipt of PP such that their observable charac-
teristics closely resemble the overall population of workers.
We run the following probit equation for the probability of being in a
PP job:
yi ¼ xiβ þ εi
yi ¼ 1 yi N0
 
where yi is equal to one if individual i is in a PP job and zero otherwise,
1[.] is the indicator function, and εi is distributed as standard normal.
The vector of explanatory variables xi contains quadratics in age and
job tenure, and dummy variables formarital status, part-timework, tem-
porary and ﬁxed jobs, trade union coverage, public sector afﬁliation, ed-
ucational qualiﬁcations, one-digit occupation and industry,
establishment size, region and year. The coefﬁcient estimates b are
used to construct weights deﬁned as wi = vi / (1 − pi), where pi =
Φ(xi b) is the predicted probability of being in a PP job, and vi is the
cross-sectional survey weight.14
Theweights are then applied to the distribution of FP pay to give ad-
ditional weight to those with high estimated probabilities of being in a
PP job (because these employees are underrepresented in the FP sam-
ple). One can then recover the “effect” of PP at different parts of the
wage distribution by comparing the actual distribution of wages
among all workers to the counterfactual distribution observed among
the reweighted set of employees not in PP jobs.
Table 6 summarises the results of the counterfactual reweighting ex-
ercise for men.We consider two points in time, namely early in the peri-
odwe study (1998–2000) and then again at the end of the period (2006–
2008).15 For each time point, we report various summary measures of
the actualwage distribution (columns 1 and 4) and the change in the dis-
persion between the two time points (column 7). The summary mea-
sures in column 7 all increased between 1998–2000 and 2006–08
(with the exception of a very small fall in the 90–50 percentile gap), al-
though the increases are generally quite small (consistent with the
graphical analysis of the actual wage dispersion in Fig. 2a), the largest14 The probit for PP jobs used to derive wi is also weighted by the endpoint adjustment
weight multiplied by the cross-sectional survey weight.
15 We correct for compositional changes among employees over time byallowing the co-
efﬁcients b in the reweighted calculations to vary by period.
Fig. 2. a — Dispersion in men's log hourly wages b — Dispersion in women's log hourly wages; c — Dispersion in full-time women's log hourly wages.
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Table 5
Level and dispersion of log hourly wages by job type, 1998–2008.
Fixed pay Broad PP Narrow PP
Mean
Men 2.244 2.465 2.536
Women 2.090 2.224 2.325
Women (FT) 2.195 2.317 2.398
Variance
Men 0.291 0.310 0.304
Women 0.296 0.281 0.267
Women (FT) 0.273 0.261 0.246
Estimates are pooled over waves 8–18 and weighted for survey design and non-response.
Number of person-observations is 22,108 (men), 23,550 (women), 14,458 (FT women).
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In columns 2 and 5 we present the samemeasures of the respective
counterfactual distributions. The differences between the two sets of es-
timates give the PP job effect at each time point (columns 3 and 6). Col-
umn 8 shows how the PP effect changed over the period. Finally, we
calculate the percentage of the change in each measure of wage disper-
sion that can be attributed to PP jobs (column 9): this is simply the ratio
of the change in the PP effect to the change in the actual wage disper-
sion. The table includes results for both the broad PP measure (top
panel) and the narrow measure (bottom panel).17
PP jobs, broadly deﬁned, account for two-thirds (68.3%) of the
growth in the variance of log hourly wages for men over the period
(row 1). The widening effect of broad PP is apparent throughout the
wage distribution, but it ismore pronounced in the upper half of the dis-
tribution, as is apparent if one compares the magnitude of the numbers
in column 8. The 99–90 gap grew the most (0.056 log points): this is
wholly accounted for by PP. Indeed, the 99–90 gap would have closed
by 0.057 log points in the absence of broad PP. Similarly the growth of
0.025 log points in 95–50 gap is more than explained by broad PP. In
contrast, broad PP actually closed the 10–1 gap between 1998–2000
and 2006–08 by 0.006 log points.18
The picture looks very different in relation to narrowPP in the bottom
panel of the table. Although narrow PP is associated with higher wage
dispersion in both periods, the size of this disequalising effect fell a little
over the period. The only part of the distributionwhere the disequalising
effect grew was near the bottom, and this effect is quantitatively small
(widening the 50–5 gap and 10–1 gaps by about 0.01 log points).
These divergent results for broad and narrow PP highlight the value
in distinguishing between various types of PP when evaluating its im-
pact onwages andwage dispersion. The results here conﬁrm the impor-
tance of bonus payments in particular in understanding PP effects on
growing wage dispersion among men at the top of the wage distribu-
tion. One possible reason why bonuses are important in affecting
wage dispersion is that bonuses are particularly prevalent at the top of
the wage distribution and, as other research using the BHPS has
shown, among men bonuses tend to substitute for ﬁxed pay at the bot-
tom of the wage distribution but this substitution effect is not apparent
at the top of the distribution (Green and Heywood, 2012).1916 Most estimates in the table involve comparing distributions (actual vs counterfactual
and/or changes over time), and so the ﬁgures are differences not levels (unlike in Fig. 2). Fol-
lowing LMP (2009)we smoothed the intermediate percentiles using amoving average of+/
−2 percentiles (the unsmoothed estimates show a very similar pattern).
17 The measures of actual dispersion are the same in each panel but are replicated for
ease of comparison with the counterfactual measures.
18 Themeasures of the 1st and 99th percentiles are quite noisy and sowedonot push the
results for the extreme tails. However, the changes in the top and bottom deciles appear
consistent with changes further towards themiddle the distribution (andwith the graphs
of the full distribution shown below).
19 Close to two-ﬁfths of male employees received bonuses during this period. BHPS also
asks “Whatwas the total amount of bonus you received over the last twelvemonths?” For
those receiving a bonus they were the equivalent of around about 3.5% of base pay in the
late 1990s, rising to 4.5–5% towards the end of our period of investigation.While Table 6 presents estimates of the size of PP effects onwage dis-
persion among men at speciﬁc points of the wage distribution, we can
also illustrate the distributional effects using graphs. Fig. 3a and b present
the effects of broad PP over the wage distribution for men. The solid line
in Fig. 3a represents the difference broad PPmade to log hourlywage dis-
persion in the period 1998–2000 by comparing the actual log hourly
wages of all male employees - who are a mixture of PP and FP workers
- with counterfactual wages based on a scenario in which nobody re-
ceives PP (the corresponding summary measures are in the top panel
of Table 6 in column 3). The counterfactual gap is fairly ﬂat in the bottom
half of the wage distribution, but then it begins to rise such that the log
wage differential is around .15 log points towards the top of the wage
distribution.
The dotted line presents the same information but for the period
2006–2008 (corresponding to column 6 in the top panel of Table 6).
The effect of PP is more pronounced in the later period, rising much
more steeply in the top half of the wage distribution. Consistent with
the summary measures reported above, the graphs indicate that PP
has a disequalising effect on wages which increased in the later period.
Fig. 3b shows the role played by broad PP in the change in the male
wage distribution between the early and late periods. The sold line
shows how themale wage distribution actually changed (corresponding
to column 7 in the top panel in Table 6), while the dotted line shows how
the male wage distribution would have changed in the absence of PP
(that is, the difference in the counterfactual scenarios for 1998–2000
and 2006–08). Thus the gap between the two lines gives the effect of
PP on changes in the distribution (corresponding to column 8 in the
upper panel of Table 6). PP makes little difference to the change in the
wagedistribution in the lower half of thewagedistribution:wagedisper-
sion grew in the lowest quartile of the distribution, andwould have done
in a similar fashion in the absence of PP. Column 8 in Table 6 shows that
PPwidened the 50–5 gap (relative to the counterfactual without PP jobs)
but it is clear from the graph that most of the change was due to a small
rise in themedian (the solid line is higher than the dotted one) and not a
fall in the 5th percentile. This illustrates how the graph can provide a
more complete picture than just comparing two points alone.
In contrast, the graph conﬁrms theﬁgures in Table 6 showing broad PP
contributed to rising earnings dispersion in the top half of thewage distri-
bution: in the absence of PP thewage growth in the upper part of the dis-
tribution would have been about half of what it actually was (an increase
of about .10 log points comparedwith about .06 log points at the 80th per-
centile, for example). In fact, what is striking from the graph is that wage
dispersion would have actually fallen between roughly the median and
the 80th percentile without PP jobs. Higher up (between about the 80th
and 90th percentiles), dispersion would have increased to a small extent,
but actual dispersion, reﬂecting the effect of PP jobs, increasedmuchmore.
As indicated in Table 6, the picture looks rather different for men if
we focus on the narrowmeasure of PP. PPmeasured in thiswaydoes re-
sult in awiderwage dispersion thanwould be the case in its absence. Al-
though thiswas the case both at the beginning and the endof our period
of investigation, the effectwas attenuated in the second period (Fig. 4a).
Consequently, the effect of narrow PP jobs on changes in the wage dis-
tribution over the period was actually to reduce that dispersion, though
not by very much (Fig. 4b).20
Nowwe turn to wage dispersion amongwomen. It is apparent from
column 7 in Table 7 that overall wage dispersion among women grew
over the period, but only very marginally (variance increased by
0.011). This is partly because trends went in opposite directions in the
top and bottom halves of the wage distribution: comparing the 50–10
and 90–50 gaps it seemswages becamemore compressed in the bottom20 As noted earlier, close to two-ﬁfths of male employees received bonuses during this
period. BHPS also asks “What was the total amount of bonus you received over the last
twelve months?” For those receiving a bonus they were the equivalent of around about
3.5% of base pay in the late 1990s, rising to 4.5–5% towards the end of our period of
investigation.
Table 6
Effect of PP jobs on log wage distribution (men), 1998–2000 and 2006–2008.
1998–2000 2006–08 1998–2000 to 2006–08
Actual
dispersion
Dispersion
without PP
jobs
PP job
effect
(2)–(1)
Actual
dispersion
Dispersion
without PP
jobs
PP job
effect
(5)–(4)
Change in actual
dispersion (4)–(1)
Change in PP job
effect (6)–(3)
Percentage of dispersion
change due to PP jobs (8)/(7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Broad PP measure
Variance 0.304 0.283 0.022 0.344 0.295 0.049 0.039 0.027 68.3
Percentile gaps
90–10 1.373 1.310 0.063 1.389 1.307 0.082 0.016 0.020 119.2
99–90 0.403 0.373 0.030 0.459 0.316 0.143 0.056 0.113 201.8
95–50 0.981 0.883 0.097 1.006 0.849 0.156 0.025 0.059 236.7
90–50 0.761 0.689 0.072 0.760 0.679 0.082 −0.001 0.010 −1146.5
50–10 0.612 0.621 −0.009 0.629 0.628 0.001 0.017 0.010 57.5
50–5 0.790 0.812 −0.022 0.844 0.830 0.014 0.054 0.036 65.9
10–1 0.323 0.337 −0.014 0.420 0.440 −0.020 0.098 −0.006 −6.2
Narrow PP measure
Variance 0.304 0.290 0.014 0.344 0.334 0.010 0.039 −0.004 −10.4
Percentile gaps
90–10 1.373 1.333 0.040 1.389 1.366 0.024 0.016 −0.017 −101.0
99–90 0.403 0.403 0.000 0.459 0.458 0.001 0.056 0.001 1.2
95–50 0.981 0.934 0.047 1.006 0.981 0.025 0.025 −0.022 −89.4
90–50 0.761 0.727 0.034 0.760 0.735 0.025 −0.001 −0.009 1062.1
50–10 0.612 0.605 0.006 0.629 0.630 −0.002 0.017 −0.008 −44.3
50–5 0.790 0.787 0.003 0.844 0.826 0.018 0.054 0.015 27.8
10–1 0.323 0.323 0.000 0.420 0.408 0.012 0.098 0.012 12.1
Fig. 3. a— Effect of PP jobs (broadmeasure) onwage distribution in 1998–2000 and2006–
2008,Men; b— Effect of PP jobs (broadmeasure) on change inwage distribution between
1998–2000 and 2006–2008, Men.
Fig. 4. a — Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on wage distribution in 1998–2000 and
2006–2008, Men; b — Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on change in wage
distribution between 1998–2000 and 2006–2008, Men.
157M. Bryan, A. Bryson / Labour Economics 41 (2016) 149–161
Table 7
Effect of PP jobs on log wage distribution (women), 1998–2000 and 2006–2008.
1998–2000 2006–08 1998–2000 to 2006–08
Actual
dispersion
Dispersion
without PP
jobs
PP job
effect
(2)-(1)
Actual
dispersion
Dispersion
without PP
jobs
PP job
effect
(5)-(4)
Change in actual
dispersion (4)-(1)
Change in PP job
effect (6)-(3)
Percentage of dispersion
change due to PP jobs (8)/(7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Broad PP measure
Variance 0.280 0.295 −0.015 0.291 0.296 −0.005 0.011 0.010 88.2
Percentile gaps
90–10 1.293 1.309 −0.016 1.306 1.336 −0.029 0.013 −0.013 −100.4
99–90 0.368 0.354 0.013 0.357 0.331 0.026 −0.011 0.012 −110.8
95–50 0.917 0.913 0.004 0.959 0.927 0.032 0.042 0.028 66.7
90–50 0.712 0.706 0.006 0.764 0.757 0.007 0.052 0.001 2.1
50–10 0.582 0.603 −0.022 0.542 0.578 −0.036 −0.039 −0.014 36.2
50–5 0.772 0.804 −0.031 0.752 0.815 −0.063 −0.021 −0.032 153.0
10–1 0.370 0.390 −0.020 0.407 0.442 −0.035 0.037 −0.015 −39.9
Narrow PP measure
Variance 0.280 0.285 −0.005 0.291 0.282 0.008 0.011 0.014 126.7
Percentile gaps
90–10 1.293 1.305 −0.012 1.306 1.285 0.021 0.013 0.033 252.4
99–90 0.368 0.367 0.000 0.357 0.355 0.002 −0.011 0.001 −12.5
95–50 0.917 0.907 0.010 0.959 0.926 0.034 0.042 0.024 56.3
90–50 0.712 0.710 0.002 0.764 0.738 0.026 0.052 0.023 44.9
50–10 0.582 0.596 −0.014 0.542 0.547 −0.005 −0.039 0.009 −24.1
50–5 0.772 0.789 −0.017 0.752 0.762 −0.010 −0.021 0.006 −30.7
10–1 0.370 0.375 −0.005 0.407 0.413 −0.006 0.037 −0.001 −1.7
Fig. 5. a— Effect of PP jobs (broadmeasure) onwage distribution in 1998–2000 and2006–
2008, All Women; b — Effect of PP jobs (broad measure) on change in wage distribution
between 1998–2000 and 2006–2008, All Women.
Fig. 6. a — Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on wage distribution in 1998–2000 and
2006–2008, All Women; b — Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on change in wage
distribution between 1998–2000 and 2006–2008, All Women.
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Table 8
Effect of PP jobs on log wage distribution (Full-time women), 1998–2000 and 2006–2008.
1998–2000 2006–08 1998–2000 to 2006–08
Actual
dispersion
Dispersion
without PP
jobs
PP job
effect
(2)-(1)
Actual
dispersion
Dispersion
without PP
jobs
PP job
effect
(5)-(4)
Change in actual
dispersion (4)-(1)
Change in PP job
effect (6)-(3)
Percentage of dispersion
change due to PP jobs (8)/(7)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Broad PP measure
Variance 0.252 0.256 −0.004 0.274 0.288 −0.015 0.022 −0.011 −51.7
Percentile gaps
90–10 1.263 1.275 −0.012 1.277 1.296 −0.019 0.014 −0.007 −50.6
99–90 0.330 0.282 0.048 0.357 0.361 −0.004 0.027 −0.052 −195.6
95–50 0.849 0.800 0.049 0.907 0.860 0.047 0.058 −0.002 −3.6
90–50 0.660 0.625 0.035 0.713 0.677 0.036 0.053 0.001 2.2
50–10 0.603 0.650 −0.046 0.564 0.618 −0.055 −0.040 −0.008 20.7
50–5 0.778 0.830 −0.052 0.766 0.887 −0.120 −0.011 −0.068 604.4
10–1 0.341 0.351 −0.010 0.408 0.462 −0.054 0.068 −0.044 −65.0
Narrow PP measure
Variance 0.252 0.254 −0.001 0.274 0.271 0.002 0.022 0.004 17.2
Percentile gaps
90–10 1.263 1.263 0.000 1.277 1.253 0.024 0.014 0.024 174.2
99–90 0.330 0.326 0.004 0.357 0.365 −0.008 0.027 −0.012 −43.1
95–50 0.849 0.822 0.027 0.907 0.866 0.041 0.058 0.014 23.7
90–50 0.660 0.638 0.022 0.713 0.665 0.048 0.053 0.026 49.0
50–10 0.603 0.625 −0.022 0.564 0.587 −0.024 −0.040 −0.002 5.2
50–5 0.778 0.801 −0.023 0.766 0.805 −0.039 −0.011 −0.016 138.3
10–1 0.341 0.345 −0.004 0.408 0.423 −0.015 0.068 −0.011 −15.8
Fig. 7. a— Effect of PP jobs (broadmeasure) onwage distribution in 1998–2000 and2006–
2008, Full-time women; b — Effect of PP jobs (broad measure) on change in wage
distribution between 1998–2000 and 2006–2008, Full-time women.
Fig. 8. a — Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on wage distribution in 1998–2000 and
2006–2008, Full-time Women; b — Effect of PP jobs (narrow measure) on change in
wage distribution between 1998–2000 and 2006–2008, Full-time women.
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21 This is achieved as follows. Firstwe estimate the probability of being in a PP job, just as
we did for the reweighting exercise reported earlier. Second, we recode the FP employees
with the highest probability of PP as PP employees, such that we achieve a 10 percentage
point growth in the incidence of PP. Third, using the original samples of PP and FP em-
ployees we estimate separate wage equations for the two sectors so that for any given
set of observable characteristics we can estimate the return to PP (that is, the difference
between what the individual would have earned in a PP job versus a FP job, conditional
on his or her observable traits). We assume unobservable characteristics are rewarded
equally across the PP and FP sectors. Fourth, we take each “new” PP employee and calcu-
late their returns to PP, conditional on their observable traits, and add this to their current
FP wage to obtain their predicted PP wage. All other wages remain the same.
160 M. Bryan, A. Bryson / Labour Economics 41 (2016) 149–161half of the wage distribution, whereas they became more dispersed in
the top half of the distribution. How did PP affect this distribution?
If we begin with the broad PP measure, it is apparent that it tended
to compress women's earnings at the bottom of the distribution in
both periods (column 3 for 1998–2000 and column 6 for 2006–2008).
This compressing effect became more apparent in the second period.
There was little effect at the top of the distribution in 1998–2000 (col-
umn 3) but some widening in 2006–2008 (column 6).
The overall effects of these counterveiling effects of the broad mea-
sure of PP on women's wages is best illustrated graphically. Fig. 5a indi-
cates that the broad measure of PP resulted in a wage distribution for
women that wasmore U-shaped than it would have been in its absence.
However, the U was ﬂatter further up the wage distribution in the sec-
ond period relative to the ﬁrst. This is why PP contributed to a growth in
wage dispersion in the top half of the wage distribution compared with
a counterfactual world without PP (compare the solid linewith the dot-
ted line in Fig. 5b). This pattern of results is similar for women when
using the narrow measure of PP jobs (Fig. 6a and b).
Finally we turn to women in full-time employment. Their wages be-
camemore dispersed over theperiod, the effect beingmore pronounced
than for all women (variance rose by 0.02, Table 8, column 7, compared
with 0.01 for all women, Table 7, column 7). However, as in the case of
all women, there was compression in earnings at the bottom of the dis-
tribution and growing earnings dispersion at the top of the distribution.
The growth in dispersion in the top half of the distribution is actually
quite substantial: the 95–50 ratio grows by 0.06 log points.
Turning to the effects of PP on the dispersion of full-time
women's earnings and focusing ﬁrst on the broad PPmeasure it is ap-
parent that PP is associated with greater wage dispersion at the top
of the distribution but lower dispersion at the bottom of the distribu-
tion. This is the case in both 1998–2000 and 2006–2008 (upper panel
Table 8, columns 3 and 6), but there is a trend towards more
equalisation over the period (that is, less expansion at the top and
more compression at the bottom, column 8).
Looking at the whole distribution graphically using the broad PP
measure the PP effect on full-time womens' earnings relative to a
counterfactual world without PP is highest at the top and bottom of
the earnings distribution, forming the U-shape referred to above
for all women. The size of this effect is larger in the second period
(2006–2008) relative to the early period (1998–2000) but it is
more similar across all the distribution, except at the very bottom
(Fig. 7a). For this reason PP (broadly deﬁned) resulted in higher
earnings among full-time working women, but it had little effect
on changing inequality except perhaps to mitigate the increase to-
wards the bottom and at the very top (Fig. 7b).
If we turn to the narrow PP measure and consider its effects on the
log hourly earnings of women working full-time this is a shallow U-
shape, in both periods, but the size of the effect is greater in 2006–08
(Fig. 8a) such that PP increases wage dispersion over the period, as indi-
cated by the rising solid line in Fig. 8b relative to the dotted line for the
counterfactual “no PP”world, once onemoves beyond the lowest quar-
tile of the earnings distribution.
5. Conclusions
There has been much speculation about the various causes of
growing wage dispersion in Britain, the United States and elsewhere.
The seminal paper by LMP (2009) showed PP contributed signiﬁ-
cantly to the growth in earnings dispersion in the United States
through to the early 1990s. Using data from the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) we adopt a similar estimation approach to
LMP but applied to Britain during the decade of economic growth
that ended abruptly with the recession of 2008. In contrast to LMP,
we ﬁnd that rather than increasing, the prevalence of PP declined
(or at most stayed ﬂat) over the decade to 2008. This applies to
both broad and narrow measures of PP (although there is someevidence that bonus payments increased), and the trends appear
comparable with more recent declines in the US identiﬁed by
Gittleman and Pierce (2013).
We conﬁrm others' ﬁndings thatwage inequality grew overall during
the decade to 2008, largely due to growing earnings dispersion in the top
half of the wage distribution, but there was also some reduction of in-
equality among women in the bottom of the distribution. The contribu-
tion of PP to these changes depends on how the incidence and returns
to PP changed and where workers sit in the wage distribution. While
the incidence of PP fell, there was still a substantial wage return to PP
and indeed it appears to have increased over time. Comparing the actual
wage distribution with a counterfactual world without PP, we ﬁnd the
net effect of these changes to be that PP is associated with greater
wage dispersion towards the top and, particularly for broad PP, and
that this disequalising effect increased over the period, possibly because
of increased bonuses. This was accompanied by some counterveiling ef-
fects at the bottom, in particular broad PP is associated with more com-
pressed wages in the lower half of the distribution for women.
However, the size of these PP effects is relatively modest, perhaps in
part because, in contrast to LMP, there is no indication that PP jobs be-
came increasingly prevalent, among either men or women, in the de-
cade prior to recession.
Given the limited changes in PP in Britain, we performed a further
counterfactual exercise to see what the effects might be if PP did ex-
pand substantially. Speciﬁcally, we simulated the effect of a 10 per-
centage point increase in PP incidence and looked at its effect on
wage dispersionas it was in 2006–08.21 The simulation reveals that
the effects of such an expansion on wage dispersion are very modest
indeed. The biggest effects come from an increase in the proportion
of men in receipt of “narrow” PP: those around the 80th percentile
of the wage distribution see an additional growth of around .025
log points in their wages compared with virtually no growth
among those at the 20th percentile in the wage distribution. The ef-
fects are small relative to thecross-sectional reweighting estimates
presented earlier because those estimates were comparing PP effects
against a counterfactual world with no PP, clearly a much bigger
change in regime than a simulated growth of 10 percentage points
in PP usage. The simulation is nevertheless useful because it conﬁrms
that, even with PP growth of a similar magnitude to LMP's for the
United States, PP is unlikely to have had profound effects on the
growth in wage dispersion in Britain.
One reason why PP may not have played a big role in the growth of
wage dispersion in Britain is that, for most people in PP jobs, PP accounts
for a relatively small percentage of their total earnings. Since 1997 BHPS
has asked employees in receipt of bonuses “Whatwas the total amount of
bonus you received over the last twelvemonths?”. For those in receipt of
bonuses, bonus amounts have been rising among men and women in
full-time employment (Appendix Fig. A.1). This is consistent with other
evidence showing that PP accounts for an increasing proportion of
ﬁrms' wage bills even though the number of ﬁrms paying for perfor-
mance has not risen (Forth et al., 2014). But the size of these bonus pay-
ments remains fairlymodest, despite their growth, andwe knownothing
from BHPS regarding the size of other performance payments.
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Appendix A
Table A.1
The PP Wage Premium, 1998–2008.B
M
W
W
N
M
W
W
M
FP
B
N
W
FP
B
N
FT
FP
B
NRaw Adjusted (OLS) Adjusted (FE)road PP
en 0.221** 0.113** 0.040**(0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
omen 0.134** 0.086** 0.066**(0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
omen (FT) 0.120** 0.095** 0.060**(0.010) (0.007) (0.008)arrow PP
en 0.228** 0.100** 0.044**(0.009) (0.006) (0.007)
omen 0.225** 0.087** 0.057**(0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
omen (FT) 0.194** 0.098** 0.047**(0.010) (0.007) (0.008)Number of persons (person-observations) is 3918 (22,108) [men]; 4221 (23,550)
[women]; 3148 (14,458) [FT women]. Dependent variable is the log hourly wage.
Regression-adjusted estimates also control for quadratics in age and job tenure, and
dummies for marital status, part-time work, temporary and ﬁxed terms jobs, trade
union coverage, public sector status, occupation (9 categories), industry (11 categories),
establishment size (3 categories), region (12 categories), andwave (8–18). Raw estimates
are weighted for survey design and non-response. Standard errors in parentheses. *signif-
icant at 10%; **signiﬁcant at 5%.
Table A.2
Mean and variance in log hourly wages over time for PP and FP employees.Mean log hourly wage Variance log hourly wage1998–2000 2006–2008 Difference 1998–2000 2006–2008
%
changeen
2.201 2.266 0.065 0.286 0.314 9.79road
PP2.398 2.527 0.129 0.300 0.324 8.00arrow
PP2.473 2.582 0.109 0.309 0.313 1.29omen
2.027 2.128 0.101 0.290 0.285 −1.72road
PP2.130 2.289 0.159 0.264 0.274 3.79arrow
PP2.213 2.405 0.192 0.256 0.253 −1.17Women
2.148 2.230 0.082 0.254 0.270 6.30road
PP2.216 2.376 0.160 0.247 0.264 6.88arrow
PP2.289 2.462 0.173 0.237 0.240 1.27Fig. A.1Amount of bonus received in the last 12 months for those in re-
ceipt of bonuses.
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